New PA Laws Raise Stakes for DUI and License Suspension Cases

Major changes are coming to two offenses that threaten thousands in Lancaster County with prison sentences: driving under suspension and driving under the influence. These sweeping changes make an experienced lawyer a must-have for anyone looking for the best chance of avoiding incarceration.

What changed

On December 22, 2025, Governor Shapiro signed several bills into law, HB 1615 among them. That law changed the Pennsylvania Vehicle and Judiciary Codes in two significant ways. First, it allows judges to impose “flat” prison sentences—sentences that order a defendant to serve a fixed amount of time in jail without any parole process or supervision—under certain circumstances. Second, it created a new crime “DUI after Diversion,” which effectively makes a prior admission to a diversionary program a conviction for DUI sentencing purposes. That bill became effective on the day that the Governor signed it.

The Governor’s press release stated that this bill aimed to “strengthen traffic safety and driving under the influence (DUI) enforcement.” However, these changes essentially are attempts to “fix” (read: get rid of) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent rulings that limited prosecutors’ ability to seek increased sentences for those facing DUI and driving under DUI-related suspension charges.

Driving under suspension—how we got here

Pennsylvania’s driving-under-suspension law, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1543, contained two provisions that appeared to require a sentencing court to impose an illegal sentence. The “mandatory” sentence this law provided violated the Judicial Code’s sentencing requirements. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court—after decades of lingering uncertainty—held that those supposed mandatory sentencing provisions were unenforceable, which meant that people charged with those crimes were no longer facing mandatory jail time.

Section 1543 of the vehicle code provided supposed mandatory sentences for second-offense driving under DUI-related suspension and first-offense driving under DUI-related suspension with a blood-alcohol content of .02% or higher. The law provided that both of those offenses were summaries and could be punished by up to ninety days in jail and a thousand-dollar fine. It did not provide a maximum sentence.

The Judicial Code, however, prohibited those mandatories. It required that courts impose jail sentences, which it terms sentences of total confinement, as a range: a minimum sentence (when an offender was eligible for parole) and a maximum sentence (when parole supervision ended or a jail had to release prisoner who had not paroled). 42 Pa. C.S. § 9456(b). Under the Judicial code, the minimum sentence cannot exceed half the maximum. Id.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took up the issue in Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021). It determined that there was no clear and discernible maximum penalty for first-offense driving under DUI-related suspension with a BAC of .02% or higher. Without a clear maximum, the statute violated the Judicial Code’s minimum-maximum rule. It held that the mandatory penalty was, therefore, unenforceable.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court followed suit for the nearly identical sentencing provision for second-offense driving under DUI-related suspension. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 271 A.3d 1286 (Pa. Super. 2022). It reached the same conclusion: that mandatory penalty was not enforceable.

The “fix” for driving under DUI-related suspension sentencing

House Bill 1615 amends the Judicial Code and Section 1543 of the vehicle code. It allows a court to impose a “flat” sentence for summary violations of the Vehicle Code and where the court imposes a sentence of fewer than ninety days incarceration. It does specifically authorize house arrest or work release instead of incarceration. The amendments, therefore, may “fix” the unenforceability of the mandatory sentencing provisions of Section 1543.

The DUI law—how we got here

The DUI laws provide increasing penalties for serial offenses. For example, first-offense DUIs are subject to a maximum term of six months’ incarceration and various mandatory minimum penalties based on the level of intoxication. Second offense DUIs, again depending on the level of intoxication, can be punished by up to five years’ incarceration and are subject to increased mandatory minimum penalties.

The overwhelming majority of first-offense DUIs resolve through the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program, which is usually referred to by its acronym “ARD.” The ARD program is not a conviction, and participation in the program does not require that the defendant admit guilt or wrongdoing. When someone successfully competes the program, their case is eligible for dismissal and their arrest records, for expungement.

In recent years, the law has reversed course several times on the treatment of people who are facing another DUI charge after completing the ARD program for their first. After several years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally determined that participation in the ARD program was not a “prior offense” that triggered the increased penalties for second-offense DUIs.

The Superior Court first addressed the issue in Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020). It determined that participation in the ARD program was not a prior offense under the DUI law and, therefore, a subsequent DUI charge was a first-offense.

Two years later, the Superior Court reversed itself in a pair of en banc decisions, Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc). It held that participation in the ARD program triggered the increased second-offense penalties.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania finally resolved the dispute in 2025 with Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 335 A.3d 1158 (Pa. 2025). The Supreme Court determined that participation in the ARD program could not count as a prior offense and did not trigger the second-offense penalties.

The “fix” for the DUI law

House Bill 1615 sidesteps the Supreme Court’s Shifflett ruling by creating a new crime. That new crime—DUI after diversion—is effectively a second-offense DUI. It also provides the prosecutors with an avenue to prove that someone previously participated in the ARD program.

A person commits DUI after diversion if the person has committed a violation of the DUI law and completed a pretrial diversionary program within the prior ten years. The ARD program is a pretrial diversionary program. It carries the same penalty as the applicable second-offense DUI.

House Bill 1615 also allows prosecutors to prove someone’s prior completion of the ARD program with certified records from PennDOT, the courts, or a similar out-of-state document. Those records would survive an ARD-related expungement.

The bottom line

Anyone facing charges for DUI or driving under DUI-related suspension has to navigate this complicated and evolving minefield. It is rife with pitfalls, and getting it wrong could mean unnecessary jail time. That is why you need an experienced advocate like Alex, Dan, or Jon in your corner.

Dan Bardo is a criminal defense attorney and shareholder at Pyfer Reese. He has handled hundreds of cases at all levels of court—from magisterial district courts to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In every case, he provides outcomes-oriented advice driven to achieve his clients’ individual strategic goals.

---

DISCLAIMER: This article is meant to be general in nature and in no way is intended for legal advice or guidance. In order to obtain legal guidance, advice, or representation schedule a consultation to discuss your specific case.